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of

Case No. 8542

JOHN WILLIAM INGRAM,
Deceased.

APP:FJLLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
John William Ingram died on November 17, 1954,
and left as his heirs at law, two brothers, M. S. Ingram
and H. L. Ingram, and three sisters, Maggie I. Coulson,
Ruth E. Marshall and Olive I. Boswell. In addition, the
decedent left him surviving many nieces and nephews
among whom are the four children of M. S. Ingram whose
names are Violet Manila Brock, Bonnie Holm, Blain
Ingram and Earl Ingram. The four nieces and nephews
just named are the beneficiaries under the documents in
dispute in this case and have nominated their father to be
administrator with will annexed. All of the brothers and
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sisters of the decedent except said M. S. Ingram oppose
the admission of the documents to probate as wills and
oppose the appointment of M. S. Ingram as administrator with will annexed. The brothers and sisters of the
decedent who oppose the admission of the documents to
probate have nominated one of their own number, Maggie
I. Coulson, to serve as administratrix in the event probate is denied the documents offered as wills.
The trial court below appointed l\I. S. Ingram .as administrator with will annexed, and admitted to probate
as the last will and testament of John William Ingram a
letter dated May 21, 1940 and addressed to Manila I.
Brock and a writing dated November 28, 1944 which was
enclosed in an envelope containing Thirteen Hundred
Dollars ($1,300.00) in government bonds. The said
brothers and sisters of the decedent prosecute this
appeal. For the purpose of this brief, the brother and
sisters of the decedent, to-wit, H. L. Ingram, l\1aggie I.
Coulson, Ruth E. Marshall and Olive I. Boswell will be
known as the "objectors" and ~I .S. Ingram and his four
children will be referred to as the "proponents" of the
will. The two documents above referred to will be called
the "will," but in so denon1inating the documents the
appeHants do not mean in any way to admit that the
docun1ents, or either of them, .are in fact wills.
On May 21, 1940, John Willian1 Ingrmn, the decedent,
wrote a letter to his niece, l\{anila I. Brock. The letter
is ad1nitted in evidence as Exhibit 1. and the envelope
in which it was contained is admitted as Exhibit 2.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS.......................................................... 14
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................... 15
ARGUMENT ····································-------------------·················----········ 18
POINT I-THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21,
1940, TO PROBATE AS A WILL FOR THE REASON
THAT THE PROPONENTS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF AND OVERCOME
THE PRESUMPTION THAT A LETTER, NOT PURPORTING ON ITS FACE TO BE A WILL, WAS NOT
EXECUTED ANIMO TESTANDI. --------------------·-·············· 18
POINT II - THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 'THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940,
TO PROBATE AS A WILL FOR THE REASON
THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROPONENTS CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY
SHOWS THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE
A WILL, BUT WAS, INSTEAD, A LETTER ADVISING ITS RECIPIENT OF A GIFT IN PRAESENTI
BEING MADE TO HER BY THE. DECEDENT AND
AN OUTLINE OF DECEDENT'S PLAN FOR MAKING INTER VIVOS GIFTS OF HIS PROPERTY IN
ORDER TO A VOID PROBATE. ·-----------------------·····----------- 26
POINT III -THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940,
TO PROBATE AS A WILL FOR THE REASON 'THAT
THE ONLY PROVISION IN SAID LETTER WHICH
COULD, BY ANY INTERPRETATION, BE CONSTRUED TO BE OF A TESTAMENTARY NATURE
IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN INSTRUCTION TO
'THE DONEE OF AN INTER VIVOS GIFT AS TO
THE USE TO WHICH THE SUBJECT OF THE
GIFT IS TO BE PUT AT 'THE TERMINATION OF
THE DONOR'S LIFE ESTATE THEREIN.-------------------- 26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
POINT IV- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DECEDENT'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28,
1944, TO PROBATE AS A WILL FOR THE REASON
'fHAT IT IS SO AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN
AS TO BE WHOLLY IN·CAPABLE OF BEING ADMINISTERED AS A WILL ................................................. 30
POINT V - IN THE EVENT THE DOCUMENTS ADMITTED TO PROBATE HEREIN AS THE WILL OF
THE DECENDENT ARE HELD NOT TO BE WILLS,
THE APPOINTMENT OF M. S. INGRAM AS EXECUTOR HEREIN SHOULD BE VACATED FOR THE
REASON THAT HIS INTERESTS ARE ADVERSE
TO AND IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTERESTS
OF THE HEIRS AT LAW OF THE DECEDENT......... 34
CONCLUSION ····················-----------------------------------················--------- 36
CASES ·CITED
Eaton vs. Blood, 201 Ia. 834, 44 ALR 1516, 175 NE 554............ 25
In Re Jensen's Estate, 37 U. 428, 108 P. 927............................ 24
Owen vs. Smith, 91 Ga. 564, 18 SE 527 ...................................... 24
TEXTS CITED
54 ALR 917 --············-----------------·-·-·······-----------------------------················· 19
40 ALR 2d 698 ..............................................................................19, 20
Page On Wills, Lifetime Edition, Section 44........................ 20-22
Page On Wills, Lifetime Edition, Section 45................................ 22
Page On Wills, Lifetime Edition, Section 46............................22-23
Page On Wills, Lifetime Edition, Section 54............................ 31
Page On Wills, Lifetime Edition, Section 57............................23, 27
Page On Wills, Lifetime Edition, Section 60............................ 24-25
Page On Wills, Lifetime Edition, Section 71 ............................25-26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
That letter reads in whole as follows :
"Nephi Ut May 21,40
Dear Neice
Now doubt this letter will be a grate surprise
to you are several surprises but never the less it
will half to come. I wish I could talk to you but
everybody is so buissy that there is no chance of
you coming over. Well Nila I am on the down
hill cline and dont feel right at all this spring so
I have decided to fix up my property and make
it air tight and this is the only way that will stand
so .am trusting to you to be as good to me as I am
to you. And am deading it to you but reserve
the right to control it till I die but iff I half to
sell part of it to live on you would half to sign
the deads which I hope you will be willing to do.
And what ever is left I want you to divide eaquill
with Earl-Bonie and Kennie and Blain and your
self this way none of the others can do any thing
iff I left the deads not recorded till I die then they
could stop you from recording them .and come in
for their share and besides Alice has come back.
And if she is here when I go give her enough
money to take her back ore go where she pleases.
I am sending the deads to you then you ean send
them back to the recorder, and have them recorded. Then send them back to me and I will
put them in a safety box in at the bank in your
.and my name with other papers and things of
value I wish that I could talk to you. Now dont
get worried at all nothing searies at all. but just
dont want to take the chances any longer the
corts would get a $1000 and then it would go to
the Sisters and brothers and they never done me
any good. I will close now with the same love as
ever. Your uncle J.W.I."
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On May 28, 1940, the decedent did the following
things:
1. He executed a war:ranty deed, deeding the whole
of the 466 acres of land comprising his farm property to
Manila Ingram Brock (Exhibit 3), but reserving a life
estate in himself. This deed was witnessed by P. N.
Anderson, his attorney, and was acknowledged before
Mae B. Petty, then the Juab County Recorder, on the
same day. This deed also included all personal property
then owned by him which was not covered by the bill of
sale referred to below.

2. He executed a warranty deed, deeding his town ,
lots to Blain M. Ingram but reserving a life estate in himself. That deed was witnessed by P. N. Anderson and
acknowledged on the same day by said Mae B. Petty.
3. He executed a bill of sale of his livestock and all
household furniture and other personal property on the
city lots to Blain M. Ingram, Earl and Kenneth (Exhibit
9) ·and that document was witnessed by P. N. Anderson.
4. He endorsed in blank his two shares of water
stock in the Nephi Irrigation Company, and had his
signature witnessed by Mrs. Clifton Belliston in the presence of P. N. Anderson (Tr. 35-36).
I

5. At six o'clock p.m., he mailed the letter referred
to above to ~Ianila I. Brock. This letter is the one which
was admitted to probate as a will.
There is nothing in the record to indicate the order
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in which these acts were done; however, in view of the
fact that the documents were prepared and witnessed
by the attorney of the decedent and were acknowledged
before the County Recorder, it seems fair to imply that
the documents were executed before the letter was sent
to Mrs. Brock, since the letter was mailed one hour .after
the close of business in the community.
On ~fay 29, 1940, Blain Ingram recorded his deed.
Some time within a few days subsequent to May 28, but
prior to June 5, Manila I. Brock received her deed from
the decedent by mail at Greenriver, Utah, (Tr. 75) and
mailed it to the Juab County Recorder at Nephi for
recording. It was recorded at nine o'clock a.m., on June
5, 1940.
According to the uniform and uncontroverted testimony of two of the proponents of the will, the two deeds
and the bill of sale covered all the property the decedent
then owned (Tr. 80 and 97). The date of delivery to
Blain M. Ingram of the bill of sale is not stated with
certainty but is believed to be about the time of the delivery of the warranty deed to him. However, actual
possession of the subject of the bill of sale was not delivered to Blain M. Ingram until some five years later,
after he had returned from service in the armed forces
in World War II (Tr. 98).
Sometime between May 28, 1940, and November 28,
1944, the decedent acquired U.S. Government Bonds of
the face value of Thirteen Hundred Dollars ($1,300.00).
The testimony of Manilla I. Brock is to the effect that
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those bonds were in her name and the decedent's name,
although she is not certain of the exact wording by which
r
that was accomplished. The bonds were placed in an envelope by the decedent and a writing on a piece of note
paper was also placed in the envelope (Tr. 75-6). That
writing was admitted for probate as a part of the will
of the decedent and reads in whole as follows :
"Nephi Utah
November 28-1944
Dear Nnese
I

In case ffo death Divide these after expenses
is all paid equile.
(s) J. W. Ingram"
The only evidence as to where this envelope and the
enclosed writing were kept is the evidence of one of the
proponents and beneficiaries of the will, Manila I. Brock.
She states that the bonds and notes were kept in the
possession of the decedent until March, 1954, when he
handed them to her as part of a whole group of papers
bundled together with elastic bands. He made no particular reference to the bonds and the writing attached
to them at the time he Handed the same to Mrs. Brock
nor at any time subsequent thereto (Tr. 72-73).
Evidence was adduced by the proponents showing
that the person t·o whom the decedent referred in his
letter of May 21, 1940, as "Neice" was Manila I. Brock
and the persons referred to as "Earl, Bonie, Kennie and
Blain" in that letter were here brothers and sisters.
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No evidence was adduced by the proponents showing to
whom the decedent referred by the word "rmese" in
the writing attached to the government bonds, nor was
any evidence adduced designating the persons among
whom the bonds attached to the writing of November 28,
1944, were to be divided "equile" (equally).
The only evidence which could by any interpretation be conceived to bear on the question of to whom the
decedent referred by the word "Nnese" (Niece) in the
writing of November 28, 1944, and the persons among
whom the bonds concerned in that writing were to be
divided equally is the testimony relating to oral statements of the decedent. It is the contention of the objectors that that evidence was evidence of to whom the decedent had already distributed his property by gifts and
deeds already executed, delivered and recorded, rather
than statements clarifying an uncertain will. It is also
the appellant's contention that no connection is shown
by the evidence between the oral statements and the
written document. The summary of the transcript of
testimony as it regards this matter is as follows:
1. Mr. Paul Booth, the banker, testified that the
decedent discussed with him arrangements for placing
his bank accounts in joint tenancy with his niece, Manila
I. Brock, and that the decedent told him he wanted the
funds in his bank accounts to go to said Manila I. Brock
upon his death.

2. Leora Belliston, a neighbor and, for .a period,
close associate of the decedent, lived at the home of the
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decedent until the year 1941. She stated that, around
May, 1940, the decedent said he was going to get his
deeds fixed in Smith's (M. S. Ingram) kids' names, and
he had them recorded, (Tr. 37) and that he was having
his property "fixed up for his kids, having it fixed so
nobody else could touch it." (Tr. 38) He said, at the
titne Mrs. Belliston purchased a piece of city property
frmn the decedent, that he had to have permission from
Smith Ingram to sell it to her for the reason that he had
had the deeds to the property all recorded and that it
was supposed to be in Blain's name (Tr. 39); that the
relation between the decedent and the four children of
Smith Ingram was one where they treated each other
"nice." (Tr. 40). At the end of her direct examination,
in sun1n1.ary, she answered the question as to statements
made by the decedent as to what was and what was not to
be done with his property as follows (Tr. 58):

"Q.

What discussion did you have about his property?

A.

'V ell, he would just say he had it fixed up so
it would go to the Ingrain children, and nobody else could touch it, because he had fixed
it up.

Q.

lie said he had made the deeds'

A.
Q.

Yes, sir.
That it was already in their,-

A.

And that he had recorded then1.

Yes, so that he said to you he had already
put the property in their nan1es'
A. Yes, sir.
Q.
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Q. In his discussions with you, Mrs. Belliston,
did he ever reflect a concern that if his estate
had to be probated, the court or someone else
would get a substantial sum of money, that
he wanted to avoid their getting it?
A.

No, he hadn't. He thought he had it fixed so
nobody could bother it.

Q. He conveyed to youA. He gave me that idea, that is what he meant.
Q. He conveyed to you the idea that he had it
fixed so it wouldn't h.ave to go to court.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. So it would not have to be probated.
A. Yes."
3. Mrs. Louise Ingram, the wife of M. S. (Smith)
Ingram and the mother of the four persons who are
the proponents of the will, testified that during 1940 and
immediately prior thereto the association between her
children and the decedent was friendly (Tr. 64) and that
they administered to the decedent's wants during the
year 1940 and prior thereto; that during the period
just after the spring of 1940 the decedent told her that
he hadn't been feeling well, had fixed up his properties,
had made his deeds out and fixed his will (Tr. 65); that,
in that connection, he had written to her daughter, Ma:r:!-ila
I. Brock and explained everything to her and what she
should do and that he had everything fixed up by a
lawyer (Tr. 65-66); that, at this same time in 1940, he
said he had everything fixed and that he had left it to
her children (Tr. 66) ; that he used to say quite a few
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times that he had his property all fixed up so that no one
else could get it, because he wanted it to go to her children (Tr. 67). In summary of her testimony and the
cross examination she testified as follows (Tr. 67-69):
"CROSS EXAMINATION by Mr. Tanner:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Mrs. Ingram, at the time of whichyou speak
where Will Ingram said he had things fixed
up so your children would get that property,
at that time he had already given the property
by deeds to your children, hadn't he~
Yes, sir.
His statement to you was that he had already
given them the property, wasn't itT
Yes, sir.
Not that he was going to, but that he had?
Yes, sir.
Your answer was yes, was it not T
Yes.
He was concerned, was he not, with getting
his property fixed up at this time, about 1940,
in such a manner that it wouldn't have to go
to court, wasn't he T
Yes, sir.
And he reflected to you in his conversations
that he had fixed it up so it would not have
to be dealt with by a court, did he not Y
He didn't say court. He said there wouldn't
be any trouble.
Did he ever reflect to you any concern
whether or not his property would have to be
probated 1
No, sir.
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Q. Never said anything about that one way or
the other'
A. No, sir.
Q. He told you he had written to Manilla 1
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he say that that writing was the one in
which he gave her the deeds to the property 1
A.

No, sir.

Q. Didn't say anything about whether or not it
was that letter.
A. He said he had written and informed her.
Q. As a matter of fact, Will Ingram wrote to
Manilla, oh, every month, or perhaps more
often than that.
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, can you give us an estimate 1
A. No. Because she was in Green River, and
I was here.
Q. Didn't they write quite often 1
A. Yes.
Q. Kept in pretty close touch, did they not 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There would have been a lot of letters to
:Manilla, would there not 1
A. Well, yes, I imagine."
4. Manila I. Brock, the principal proponent of the
will, said in relation to the writing attached to the bonds,
that her uncle gave her a whole lot of papers in the hospi-
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tal in ~larch of 1954 mnong which was the envelope
and the writing concerning the bonds (Tr. 88) and that
he said to her "I have some p.apers here for Blain and
yourself, take care of them." On cross examination her
testimony in relation to the bonds and the writing in the
envelope with them was as follows (Tr. 77-78):

"Q.

When you got those bonds in the first instance, they were not referred to by your
Uncle Will individually in any way, were
they f By that, I mean he just handed you
a lot of papers, among which was this envelope including the bonds.

A.

The bonds was among the papers.

Q.

Yes, there were a number of papers.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And among the papers was an envelope which
you received that was unopened f

A.

Yes.

Q.

And your uncle didn't make any special reference to that envelope, did he, when he handed
the paper over to you f

A.

Not that one in particular.

Q.

He just gave you the group of p.apers?
Yes.

A.

Q.
i:

II

Then subsequent to that ti1ne you opened the
envelope and saw the bonds and this paper,
is that right Y
A. After that, yes.

Q.

And when did you open that! \Vas it A. \Vell-
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Q. - before or after his
A.

death~

Before, when I had the papers in my possession I glanced through them.

Q. And when you glanced through them was the
first time you saw them~
A. Yes.

Q. After your uncle handed you these bonds,
which were included among the other papers,
did he ever make any individual or separate
reference to you other than what he had written in the envelope'
A.

vVell, not pertaining to the bonds, no, he
didn't make any particular mention."

5. Bonnie Hohn, one of the proponents states that
she came into the w.ard where the decedent was at the
time he was handing :Manila some papers and heard hin1
say to her "Now these are for you and Blain. Take care
of them."
The only mention in the entire transcript of the word
"will" was a statement of :Mrs. Louise Ingram to the
effect that, shortly after the spring of 1940, Will Ingram
said to her that he had made a will. There is no evidence
or testimony whatever in the entire proceeding relating
that statement to any document. Particularly, there is
no evidence relating that statement to either of the documents ad1nitted to probate herein as wills.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A
WILL FOR THE REASON THAT THE PROPONENTS HAVE
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF AND
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT A LETTER, NOT
PURPORTING ON ITS FACE TO BE A WILL, WAS NOT
EXECUTED ANIMO TESTANDI.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A
WILL FOR THE REASONS THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROPONENTS CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY SHOWS THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE
A WILL, BUT WAS, INSTEAD, A LETTER ADVISING ITS
RECIPIENT OF A GIFT IN PRAESENTI BEING MADE TO
HER BY THE DECEDENT AND AN OUTLINE OF DECEDENT'S PLAN FOR MAKING INTER VIVOS GIFTS OF HIS
PROPERTY IN ORDER TO AVOID PROBATE.

POINT III
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A
WILL FOR THE REASON THAT THE ONLY PROVISION
IN SAID LETTER WHICH COULD, BY ANY INTERPRETATION, BE CONSTRUED TO BE OF A TESTAMENTARY
NATURE IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN INSTRUCTION
TO THE DONEE OF AN INTER VIVOS GIFT AS TO THE
USE TO WHICH THE SUBJECT OF THE GIFT IS TO BE
PUT AT THE TERMINATION OF THE DONOR'S LIFE
ESTATE THEREIN.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DECEDENT'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28, 1944, TO PROBATE AS
A WILL FOR THE REASON 'THAT IT IS SO AMBIGUOUS
AND UNCERTAIN AS TO BE WHOLLY INCAPABLE OF
BEING ADMINISTERED AS A WILL.

POINT V
IN THE EVENT THE DOCUMENTS ADMITTED TO
PROBATE HEREIN AS THE WILL OF THE DECEDENT
ARE HELD NOT TO BE WILLS, THE APPOINTMENT OF
M. S. INGRAM AS EXECUTOR HEREIN SHOULD BE VACATED FOR THE REASON THAT HIS INTERESTS ARE
ADVERSE TO AND IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTERESTS
OF THE HEIRS AT LAW OF THE DECEDENT.

STATEl\iENT OF THE CASE
John William Ingram, the decedent, owned, either
at the time of his death or immediately prior thereto,
a substantial amount of property including in the neighborhood of $20,000.00 in bank accounts and mortgages
receivables and $1,300.00 in government bonds. All of
this property has been taken into the possession of
Manila I. Brock on the theory that she was a valid
joint tenant with the decedent in the hank accounts,
government bonds and receivables and became the owner
of the property upon the decedent's death. As to the
government bonds, and some minor assets stated to be in
the estate of the decedent, as reflected by the petition
of M. S. Ingram for letters of administration with will
annexed, there is a conflict between the two groups in-
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volved in this litigation, i.e., on one side, M. S. Ingram
and his four children, the proponents of the so-called
will, and on the other side, brothers and sisters of the decedent, called the objectors as mentioned earlier in this
brief. However, the real controversy relates to the bank
accounts and the receivables which have not been listed
by said M. S. Ingram as being assets of the estate. The
struggle reflected in this n1atter to date centers around
the appointn1ent of ~I. S. Ingran1 as administrator and
the admission of the documents as the will of the decedent. The appointment of the administrator is deemed of
key importance by both groups for the reason that the
administrator can select his attorney and can govern
whether or not a serious attempt will be made to secure
the return of the cash and receivables to the estate .as
assets, or not. The objectors believe that, if a genuine
effort is made, those assets can be shown to properly
be the property of the estate, but that, if a half-hearted
effort, or no effort at all, is 1nade, an opposite result
1nay be anticipated. In addition it is deemed important
by the objectors that so1neone other than ~I. S. Ingram
be appointed in order that the estate itself n1ay carry the
financial burden of the litigation concerning the bank
accounts and the receivables rather than the objectors
having to carry th.at financial burden themselves and
having to force the affininistrator to seek those assets.
It is apparent then, that the issues of law involved in
this brief concern substantially larger assets than are
reflected in the petition over whirh this conflict now centers.
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The essence of the argument of the objectors is that
the letter written by the decedent to 1\ianila I. Brock
is not a testamentary document at all, but is simply a
letter explaining to her the steps taken by the decedent,
under the advice of his attorney, P. N. Anderson, to then
dispose of all of his property in order to avoid probate.
The objectors believe this is proved both by the wording
of the letter itself and by the evidence introduced both
by the proponents and by the objectors in connection
with that letter. That evidence shows conclusively that
:M. S. Ingram n1ade deeds or bills of sale, in praesenti,
passing title to all the property he owned in 1\iay 1940.
The only effect his death was expected to have upon
his property would be that it would terminate his life
estate in the real property. If a present disposition of
his property was what the decedent intended and acconlplished in 1940, the requisite animo testandi is missing
and the letter cannot be admitted to probate as a will.
The objectors claim that the document attached to
the bonds, and reading "Dear Nnese, In case ffo death
Divide these after Expenses is all paid equile" is so
lacking in necessary certainty that, by itself, it could not
be expected to stand as a testamentary document. However, the proponents claim that, if it is viewed as a codicil to the letter of 1940, it then takes on the requisite certainty. The objectors claim that there is no evidence in
the record whatever either giving that document sufficient certainty to be admitted as a will or connecting
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the document In any :m,anner whatever with the letter
of 1940.
After hearing and argument below, the trial court,
the Honorable Will L. Hoyt presiding, admitted both
letters to probate as a single will .and this appeal is taken
by the obj~ctors. The question as to whether the assets
of the estate of the decedent which are not covered by
either of the documents admitted to probate below should
pass to the objectors as the heirs at law of the decedent,
being a question of the interpretation of a will rather
than its admissibility, has been reserved until such time
as there is a determination by this court as to whether
or not the controverted documents are in fact wills.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
'THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A
WILL FOR 'THE REASON THAT THE PROPONENTS HAVE
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF AND
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT A LETTER, NOT
PURPORTING ON ITS FACE TO BE A WILL, WAS NOT
EXECUTED ANIMO TESTANDI.

The essential issue in this appeal is whether the evidence adduced herein shows that the two letters admitted
to probate as a will were in fact wills, or were in fact
jointly a single will, or were in fact not wills at all, either
separately or jointly. In determining that 1natter, the
court is guided by certain presu1nptions, the first of
which presumptions is that an informal instrument, such
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as .a letter, not purporting on its face to be a will, was not
executed animo testandi and therefore is not a will. This
presumption is pointed up in two comprehensive A.L.R.
annotations covering most of the problems presented in
this appeal. r:rhe annotations discuss the admissibility
of a letter as a will or codicil. The first of these annotations is at 54 A.L.R. 917 and the second, bringing the
propositions in the first .article up to a very recent date,
is at 40 A.L.R. 2d 698. These annotations have direct
application to the letter of May 21, 1940, upon which
the devolution of all of decedent's property save and
except the $1,300.00 worth of government bonds, must
depend.
At Page 932 of 54 A.L.R., the subject of presumption is discussed as follows :
"It is generally conceded that in addition to
the usual burden of proof resting upon the proponent of a will in probate proceedings, it is also
presumed that an informal instrument, such as a
letter, not purporting on its face to be a will, was
not executed animo testandi. 1 Redfield, Wills,
F,ourth Edition, 167."
(This is cited as being the rule in Texas,
England, Californ1a and Montana, and no jurisdictions are cited as dissenting from this rule.)
"Although it has been erroneously referred to
as applicable in some of the cases, the presumption against intestacy, being a rule for the construction of wills, should not be applied to the
issue of testamentary character, which arises only
in the probate of the will, and not in its construction. In re Anthony (1913), 21 Cal. App. 157,
131 P. 96."
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This p_resumption is discussed in the article in 40
A.L.R. 2d at Page 728, citing cases approving the rule
set forth in the earlier annotation.
It is clear then that the proponents of the letter of
:May 21, 1940, have not only the usual burden of proving
that said letter was executed with testamentary intent,
but, in ·addition, must overcome the presumption that it
was not executed with testamentary intent.
In connection with this point and the points raised
1n the balance of. this brief it may be well to consider
as background the comprehensive discussion in Page
on Wills, Lifetime Edition, setting forth the tests by
which one can ascertain whether a given document is a
will, or s01ne other kind of instrument, such as, in the
instant case, a mere letter of explanation. In this regard
it should be pointed out that the appellants do not urge
that the controversial letter lacks the formal requirements for an olograph. The point of the appellants is
that, although the letter would suffice as an olograph,
being entirely written, dated and signed in the hand of
the decedent, it lacks the inherent, intrinsic and essential
elen1ents of a will. The following extracts from Page on
\V1ll:-:;, supra, set forth that author's .authoritative views
on the subject at hand:

"Sec. 44. Elements of tllc will.
"In Anglo-An1erican law the will is a distinct
legal concept; as distinct as the deed or the
contract. Its characteristic elmnents distinguish
it, and 1nark it off, fron1 other leg.al concepts.
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"In part, for convenience of discussion, and in
part, because they are frequently confused, in
spite of their essential difference, the elements
of a will must be grouped under two general
classes. One of these consists of the essential,
intrinsic, or inherent elements; and the other of
the extrinsic, or formal elements. Although this
distinction, as a rule, is not made by the courts
in so many words, it is constantly recognized by
the courts; and serves as the basis of their treatment of the entire subject.
"The formal or extrinsic elements of a will
are the elements which may be modified without
changing the essential nature of the will. These
elements deal with the form in which the will must
be executed in order to be operative; such as the
signature by testator and .attestation and subscription by witnesses. While these elements are
of the greatest practical importance, as a will
which is executed without complying with the
necessary requirements is of no effect, the law
may be altered, so as to require signature by
testator, or signature at a given place; or so as
to dispense with signature altogether; or so as
to require attestation and subscription by any
number of witnesses, or so as to dispense with
it altogether, without changing the essential nature of the will or its place in the law. For this
reason, these elements are spoken of as extrinsic
or formal. In almost every state, they are now
regulated and controled by statute. They are
discussed in detail elsewhere.
"The inherent, intrinsic, or essential elements
of a will are those which can not be altered without changing the nature of the will itself, and
affecting its position in our law. The essential
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idea of a will is that it takes effect only upon
the death of the testator, and that it p.asses no
interest in property until his death; although
it may create property rights which do not vest
until after testator's death.

* * *
"In order to have an operative instrument,
the formalities or extrinsic elements must be
those which the law requires for an instrument
of the type which the instrument in question is
finally determined to be, after a study of its
essential or inherent elements."
"Sec. 45. The Origin and Classes of Inherent
Elements.
"The inherent elements of a will at AngloAmerican law do not depend on legislation. They
depend on principles of law which do not depend
upon legislation. Some of these principles can
be traced back through the law of Germanic
England before the Norman Conquest, and others
were worked out by the English ecclesiastical
law, or by equity.
"Whatever their ultimate source, they had
been developed by the English and American
courts into .a distinctive body of law.
''It is frequently said that these inherent eleInents consist of (1) the intention to make a will;
and (2) revocability. As will be seen later, the
latter of these ele1nents follows from the former.
It is rather a consequence of the first, than a
separate class."

Section 46. Intentiou to Make Will - Use
of tlie Word 'TVill.'
"The courts have Baid again and again that
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the test whether or not an instru1nent is testamentary in character is whether it was executed
with animus testandi; with testamentary intent.
While this is standard form of orthodox statement, it is, in itself, of little help, since it does
not explain what the animus testandi is.
"Animus testandi does not necessarily mean
that the word 'will' or 'testament' must be used
in the transaction. A man may make his will
animo t~standi, though he is so ignorant of law
that he thinks it is called a deed or contract; or
though he does not know what to call it. The test
is not what he thinks is the legal name of the
instrument which he is executing, but what its
leg.al effect is in view of its nature, and of the
real intention of the maker as deduced from the
instrument and from all facts and circumstances.
The fact that the testamentary provisions form
a very small part of the entire document, the
bulk of which is not intended to oper.ate as a
will, does not make such small part of the instrument inoperative as a will.

* * *
"The animus testandi, then, does not turn
on the presence or absence of the words 'will' or
'testament', but on the intention of the testator
as shown by the nature of the instrument and
the surrounding facts .and circumstances."
"Sec. 57. Intention to Make Testamentary
Gift by Instrument in Question.
"In order that an instrument may amount
to a will, it must show testator's intention to
make a testamentary gift by that instrument, as
distinguished from a gift to be made, or spoken of
as already made, by some other instrument. (Cit-
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ing among other cases, In re Jensen's Estate, 37
Utah 428, 108 Pac. 927.)

* * *
"If testator's intention appears to be to make
a gift by the instrutnent in question, to take effect
on his death, the instrument is a will, although
no formal words of devise or bequest may appear,
and the instrument itself is chiefly a recital of
facts or says that testator 'wants to make a deed'.

"Section 60. Intention That Instrument Shall
Take Effect Only At Death of Testator.
"If an instrument is executed animo testandi,
the person who executes it intends such instrument
to take effect only at his death. This is inevitable
if the instrument merely appoints an executor,
or a guardian for testator's minor children to
act on testator's death." In each of these cases
testator must intend that his own death shall
take place before such appointment shall take
effect. If the instrument disposes of property,
it is just as possible for the donor to intend to
give such property during his lifetime as after
his death. The in1port.ant distinction between the
will and the other instru1nents with which it may
be confused is that the will does not take effect
until the death of the testator, and no interest
of any kind passes under it until the death of
the testator; while under n1ost of the instrun1ents,
which 1nust be distinguished frmn the will, some
interest is intended to pass, and the instru1nent
is intended to take effect, during the lifetime
of thr parties thereto .... "
1\rotes to Section 60.

"A rule recognized by this court, which seems
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to have the united support of the authorities,
furnishes .an unerring test to determine the character of the instrument. It is this: If the instrument passes a present interest, althottgh the
right to its possession and enjoyment may not
occur until some future time, it is a deed or contract; but if the instrument does not pass an
interest or right until the death of the maker,
it is a will or testamentary paper." Owen vs.
Smith 91 Ga. 564, 18 S.E. 527.
"The essence of a testamentary disposition
of property is that it be merely a declaration of
the testator's intention as to what shall take
place after his death." Eaton vs. Blood, 201 Ia.
834, 44 A. L. R. 1516, 208 N.W. 508.

"A will is an instrument by which a person
makes disposition of his property to take effect
after his death." Austin vs. First Trust and
Savings Bank, 343 Ill. 406, 175 N.E. 554.
Section 71. Revocability.
"Revocability is .an- essential element of a
will. It follows from the idea that the will passes
no present interest in the property devised or
bequeathed. Such property still belongs to the
original owner. He has parted with no interest
in it by making the will. He can still sell the
property or exchange it, or pledge it or give it
away. He may revoke the will already made and
make a new will, or die intestate, as he pleases.
So closely is revocation tied up with the fact that
a will passes no interest during the life of the
testator, that it seems as though one of these
statements were only a repitition of the other in
different words. ·It is possible that a systern of
law might be imagined in which a will was ir-
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revocable and yet passed no interest during the
lifetime of testator; but this is not the way we
think or talk about the legal institution of the
will.
"If the instrument executed is such that the
maker can not revoke it, it may be a deed, a contract, and the like, but it can not be a will. And
on the other hand, if the instrument is a will,
it is revocable." (Italics added.)
With the above discussion in mind, let us proceed
to other points of this brief.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A
WILL FOR ·THE REASONS THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROPONENTS CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY SHOWS THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE
A WILL, BUT WAS, INSTEAD, A LETTER ADVISING ITS
RECIPIENT OF A GIFT IN PRAESENTI BEING MADE TO
HER BY THE DECEDENT AND AN OUTLINE OF DECEDENT'S PLAN FOR MAKING INTER VIVOS GIFTS OF HIS
PROPERTY IN ORDER TO AVOID PROBATE.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DECEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A
WILL FOR THE REASON THAT THE ONLY PROVISION
IN SAID LETTER WHICH COULD, BY ANY INTERPRETATION, BE CONSTRUED TO BE OF A TESTAMENTARY
NATURE IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN INSTRUCTION
TO THE DONEE OF AN INTER VIVOS GIFT AS TO THE
USE TO WHICH THE SUBJECT OF THE GIFT IS TO BE
PUT AT THE TERMINATION OF THE DONOR'S LIFE
EST ATE THEREIN.
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These two points will be discussed together.
On May 28, 1940, the decedent disposed of all the
property, real and personal, then owned by him, and he
made that disposition, irrevocably, by present warranty
deeds delivered and recorded and by bills of s.ale. After
those transfers were made, he mailed to his niece, Manila
I. Brock, the letter dated !iay 21~ 1940, but mailed at
six o'clock p. m., May 28, 1940. The effect of that letter
and its essential nature must be considered in connection
with the facts surrounding its execution and delivery.
The fact th.at the letter was written, though not mailed,
prior to the actual execution of the documents executed
May 28, 1940, shows only that it is one of a sequence
of events intended to carry out the wish of the decedent
as it existed in May 1940. When the decedent got everything taken care of, he mailed the letter of instruction
and information to his niece and, in a separate cover,
mailed the deeds referred to in it. The testimony is
uniform .and unequivocal that the warranty deed to
Manila I. Brock is the deed referred to in that letter.
Did the decedent intend to accomplish anything
by the letter itself~ If he did not intend to govern the
passage of his property after his death by this letter
itself, it is not a will. As stated in Page on Wills, supra,:
"In order that an instrument may amount to a will, it
must show testator's intention to m.ake a testamentary
gift by that instrument as distinguished from a gift
to be made or spoken of as already made by some other
instrument."
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The decedent intended to accomplish the following
things by the letter itself:
To advise his niece that he had deeded to her
his farm and the personal property covered in the deed.
1.

2. To advise his niece that he reserved the right to
control the property until he died and that he had accomplished that control by reserving a life tenancy.
3. To advise his niece that, in connection with the
gift presently being made, he expected her to be good
enough to him to deed back any portion of the property
which he might have to sell to live on. This, however,
was precatory and was recognized to be, and understod
to be a reservation not enforceable at law.
4. To advise his niece that whatever portion of the
property he did not request to be deeded back to him
in order to pay his living expenses, was not hers to
hold for herself alone but was hers to divide equally
with her two brothers and sister.
5. To advise his niece that it was necessary for
the deeds to be recorded so that there then be a present
completed gift of his property in order to avoid the
probate of his property.
6. To advise his niece that he was concerned with
the status of his property because his ex-wife, ....Uice,
had come back to Utah and to tell his niece that if Alice
is in Utah at the tune of the death of the decedent, his
niece is to give her enough money to take her back to
wherever she pleases.
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The only portion of this document which c.an, by
any stretch of the imagination, be interpreted to be of
a testamentary nature rather than of a discussion of a
gift praesenti, is the following:
"And whatever is left I want you to divide eaquill
with Earl-Bonnie and Kennie and Blain .and yourself"
That sentence cannot be lifted out of the context
of the letter without completely altering its clear intent.
When viewed in light of the contemporaneous events
and the rest of the letter, that sentence clearly means
that Manila I. Brock is to divide equally with her two
brothers and sister all portions of the property then
being deeded to her which have not been deeded back
prior to the death of the decedent to furnish him with
money upon which to live. To give it any other construction is to do violence to the clear meaning of the
whole of the letter and is to do violence to the plan of
the decedent then being carried out, that is, a series of
gifts in praesenti passing all of his property to the
objects of his benevolence, but reserving a life estate
to himself. The pertinent portions of the letter in this
regard .are as follows :
"Well Nila I am on the down hill cline and
dont feal right at all this spring so I have decided
to fix up my property and make it air tight and
this is the only way that will stand so am trusting
to you to be as good to me as I .am to you. And
am deading it to you but reserve the right to
control it till I die but if I half to sell part of it
to live on you would half to sign the dead which
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I hope you will be willing to do. And what ever
is left I want you to divide eaquill with Earl-Bonie
and Kennie and Blain and your self • • • I am
sending the deads to you then you can send them
back to me and I will put them in ·a safety Box
in at the bank in your and my name with other
property and things of value I wish that I could
talk to you."
In addition to the clear meaning of these words as
relating solely to the residuum of the property being
deeded to Manila Brock with life tenancy reserved,
there is the rule of law set forth in Point I to the effect
that the presumption is against the consideration of this
letter as a will.
As is apparent from the evidence as summarized
in the statement of facts herein, the only testimony
adduced by the proponents of this letter as a will was
evidence that the decedent orally stated a number of
times that he had already fixed up his property so that
it would not have to go to court. The issue in this case
is whether he fixed up his property in that manner by
making present gifts of it or by making .a will to control
the devolution of his property upon his death. It is clear
from the evidence that he was referring to present gifts
already executed and completed and did not intend that
the letter should pass any interest upon his death.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DECEDENT'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28, 1944, TO PROBATE AS
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A WILL FOR THE REASON THAT IT IS SO AMBIGUOUS
AND UNCERTAIN AS TO BE WHOLLY INCAPABLE OF
BEING ADMINISTERED AS A WILL.

Ordinarily the question of the construction of a
will would not concern the court at the time the document
is proposed for probate. The rules for the construction
of wills are detailed by statute in this state and generally have no application until such time as the will has
been admitted to probate and the problem of what property has been bequeathed to whom arises. However, a
document can be so uncertain and ambiguous as to be
incapable of administration as a will. In that event,
the rule is that it ought not to be admitted to probate
at all. That rule is set forth in Page on Wills, Lifetime
Edition, Sec. 54, as follows :

usee. 54. Expression of Intention in Definite
Terms.
The intention of testator to make a testamentary disposition of his property, or to appoint
an executor or a testamentary guardian, must
be expressed in such terms as the court can
determine what was his wish without resort to
conjecture. Both the thing given and the person
to whom it is given must, in testamentary dispositions of property, be set forth with such
certainty that the court can give effect to such
gift when the estate is to be distributed."
The whole of the pencil-written note, wholly written,
dated and signed by the decedent and enclosed in an
envelope together with $1,300.00 worth of government
bonds is as follows :
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"Dear Nnese
In case ffo death
Divide these after expenses is all paid
equile.
/s/ J. W. Ingram"
It is apparent that there is nothing in this note to
connect it in any way with the letter written more than
four years previous at the time the decedent deeded
away all the property he then had. Apparently the decedent acquired some bonds in the intervening period
and intended to dispose of them after his death by the
note he enclosed with them. The very existence of that
note is strong argument against the interpretation of
the letter of ~lay 21, 1940 as a will. Had that letter been
intended to be a will, and had the decedent intended
that all of his property go to his nieces and nephews
under that letter of May 21, there would have been no
need for any supplemental writing.
One cannot tell fr01n the face of this document to
whom it is addressed, other than that it is addressed to
one of the many nieces of the decedent. One cannot tell
from the face of this docun1ent an1ong whom the residuary of the proceeds of those bonds, after expenses in
ea~e of death, are to be divided equally. If these deficiencies are elearl~· supplied by the parol evidence adduced by the proponents of this document as a will, the
document should be admitted to probate, but it should
be the whole of the will and the sole will of the decedent
and should pertain only to the bonds to which it was
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attached and to which it refers. This would leave the
balance of the estate of the decedent to pass to the objectors by virtue of their position as heirs of the decedent.
Wbat, then, does the parol evidence adduced by the
proponents establish~ All P.aul Booth's testimony was
to the effect that the decedent wanted his bank accounts
placed in joint tenancy with his niece, Manila I. Brock.
Leora Belliston testified that, in 1940, the decedent
believed he had already fixed his property so that it
then had p.assed to his nieces and nephews. Louise
Ingram's testimony likewise was confined to the period
of about May 1940 and likewise was to the effect that
the decedent believed he had already passed his property
to his nieces and nephews and the property would not
have to go to court. Nowhere in any of the or.al testimony
of the proponents is there any evidence that, in the
writing of November 28, 1944, it was intended by the
decedent that the persons among whom the bonds were
to be divided were the two nieces and the two nephews.
There is testimony that, in March 1954, the decedent
handed a large number of papers, including all his personal papers, to Manila I. Brock and said "I have some
papers here for Blain and yourself, take care of them."
To give this document effect as a will, this court
would have to hold that the delivery of it to Manila I.
Brock among other papers completely without any specific reference to it, either before or after the handing
of this large number of papers to Manila, is sufficient
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evidence that she is the "nnese" to which the writing
referred. Further the court would have to find from
the words "I have some papers here for Blain and yourself, take care of them" that sufficient certainty was
given to the words "divide these equile" to enable this
document to be pro bated. In the field of wills, such
uncertain and unsubstantiated conclusions ought not to
be reached on the basis of such evidence. There are
sound reasons of public policy for the avoidance of fraud
which ought to be given consideration in this regard.
POINT V
IN THE EVENT THE DOCUMENTS ADMITTED TO
PROBATE HEREIN AS THE WILL OF THE DECEDENT
ARE HELD NOT TO BE WILLS, THE APPOINTMENT OF
M. S. INGRAM AS EXECUTOR HEREIN SHOULD BE VACATED FOR THE REASON THAT HIS INTERESTS ARE
ADVERSE TO AND IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTERESTS
OF THE HEIRS AT LAW OF THE DECEDENT.

If this court finds that the letter of May 21, 1940,
was in fact .a will and is entitled to probate and finds
that the letter of November :28, 1944, was a part of that
will and is entitled to probate as a part of said will,
M. S. Ingram ought properly to be the administrator
of this estate for the reason that his function will be to
preside over the passing of the property of this estate,
or at least that portion of said property which is covered by the wills to his sons and daughters. This is a
function which a father can carr~~ out in good conscience
and without sueh abnonnal strain as would render him
compet0nt or unwise or subjeet to undue influence.
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However, in the event this court finds that the letter of
May 21, 1940, wa.s not a will, whether or not this court
finds that the note of November 28, 1944, is admissable
to probate, M. S. Ingram ought not to be appointed
administrator. For to give him that .appointment would
be to place upon him the burden of getting back from
his own sons and daughters the proceeds of the bonds
and the $20,000.00 in bank accounts and other receivables
which they have already distributed to themselves.
The heirs at l.aw of the decedent, save and except
M. S. Ingram himself, alii oppose and object to his administration of the estate. This objection should be
given no countenance if the heirs at law have no interest
in the estate or if they have an interest only in a minority
portion of the estate; however, if the bulk of the estate
of the decedent is to pass to the heirs at law, their almost
unanimous wishes ought to be respected. Not only would
this be equitable and just but, in the instant case, it
would be simple humanity. 1\L S. Ingram ought not,
in that event, to be placed in the position of having to
pursue his sons and daughters for the return of sub' stantial amounts of property for the benefit of their
antagonists. He could not be expected to do this job
fairly or without substantial conflict with the other
heirs at law who have evidenced that they can have no
faith in his fairness or his justice.
The cross examination of Mrs. Coulson, who has
petitioned to be, ·and has been designated by her brother
and sisters to be, the administratix, throws some doubt
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upon her capacity to act as administrator. In the event
this court feels that she cannot, in conjunction with
competent counsel of her choice, properly handle the
affairs of this estate, the solution is not the appointment
of the controversial M. S. Ingram as administrator but
is an instruction that some other capable person be
nominated by the objectors and be properly appointed
with bond to carry out his lawful duty.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, that is, that the
letter of May 21, 1940, is not a testamentary document
and that the note of November 28, 1944, is not sufficiently certain to be probated, the appellants respectfully request this court to reverse the order of the trial
court admitting said documents to probate and appointing M. S. Ingram as administrator with will attached.
Further, the appellants request that the order of the
trial cour~ dismissing the petition of the appellant Maggie
I. Coulson for appointment as administratrix be reversed.
Respectfully Submitted,
EARL D. TANNER
Attorney for Appellants
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